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I
INTRODUCTION
Global governance is expanding fast and in different directions, often
without a clear or principled framework to guide institutional creation and
change. Formal international institutions, intergovernmental networks, and
private authorities operate side by side, sometimes in unison, sometimes in
conflict, and all of them have close relations with a variety of domestic political
actors. Yet the rise of authority on the global level has provoked increasing
challenges, and calls for a more principled approach to allocating powers among
different sites of governance have grown louder in recent years.
1
One principle often put forward in this context is “subsidiarity.”
Subsidiarity is typically understood as a presumption for local-level
decisionmaking, which allows for the centralization of powers only for
particular, good reasons. The principle is widely seen as an attractive starting
point for thinking about, and designing, the vertical distribution of powers in
multilevel systems, as it reflects the idea that self-government is typically more
2
meaningful on a smaller scale. Yet the indeterminacy of the principle, as well as
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1. See, e.g., THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds.,
2008); DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER (1995); Andreas Føllesdal, The
Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in International Law, 2 GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM 37 (2013); Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A
Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2004); Robert Howse & Kalypso
Nicolaïdis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?, 16
GOVERNANCE 73 (2003).
2. See, e.g., FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014);
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON SUBSIDIARITY (Michelle Evans & Augusto Zimmermann eds., 2014)
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the negative consequences that might flow from leaving decisions at the
national level, has also led to vocal critique.
With this symposium, we analyze and evaluate the place and role of
subsidiarity as a political and legal norm in global governance. We seek to
understand in what contexts subsidiarity and related concepts have emerged
and what variation they show across issue areas, institutional contexts, and
involved actors. For this purpose, we inquire into different sites of
decisionmaking (domestic, regional, transnational, and international) in the
design of: new institutions; political and regulatory normmaking; and
adjudication. Bringing together scholars from law, political science, and political
philosophy, we seek to map the emerging landscape of subsidiarity, understand
factors behind its shape, assess the status of subsidiarity as a legal or political
norm, trace the effects of the use of subsidiarity, and evaluate its suitability as a
guiding principle in the different contexts under analysis.
In this framing article, we set the scene for this inquiry in five steps. We
begin by outlining the rise of international authority and situating subsidiarity
among alternative principles that might guide the allocation of powers between
different levels of governance (part II). We then set out different possible
versions of subsidiarity and clarify in which way we use the concept here (part
III). Next, we draw on the literatures of comparative politics and law, as well as
European Union (EU) studies, to assess experiences with subsidiarity in the
context of other multilevel systems (part IV). We use these, as well as insights
from the contributions to this symposium, to generate a number of hypotheses
about the prevalence, potential, and limitations of subsidiarity in the context of
global governance (part V). Finally, we assess to what extent, and in what
circumstances, subsidiarity might be desirable as a guiding principle (part VI).
We conclude in part VII by offering some final thoughts on what role
subsidiarity should ultimately play in practice.
The picture that emerges from this inquiry is not a homogeneous one. As
reflected in this framing article and in the other contributions to this
symposium, both analytically and normatively, there is significant variation
across issue areas and institutional contexts. Yet even though subsidiarity may
not provide all the answers to the challenge of allocating powers in global
governance, it represents a useful starting point. Reflecting a general preference
for local decisionmaking, subsidiarity is a suitable default rule for many areas of
global governance and can, if properly specified and institutionalized, help to
channel the activities of global institutions into areas in which they can be
justified on a principled basis.

(providing assessments of subsidiarity in (mostly) national contexts).
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II
THE ALLOCATION OF POWERS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
The period since World War II has been characterized by the constant rise
of international authority. Bilateral and multilateral treaties as well as
international organizations have been growing in number and scope, and they
have come to affect most fields of governance in one way or another.
International authority has also become stronger and more independent of the
preferences of individual states. States have delegated increasing authority to
international institutions and international courts, many international bodies
have evolved well beyond initial expectations, and new forms of transnational
and private authority have emerged outside of formal delegation structures
3
altogether.
For long, many scholars of international law and international relations
viewed the rise of global authority in a positive light, as having increased the
4
collective problem-solving capacity in an interdependent world. In recent
years, however, several negative effects have been noticed more widely. These
effects relate, in the first place, to a greater politicization of international
5
authority, opening up new cleavages in domestic politics, with an increase in
political groups characterized by pronounced skepticism of all things
international. The greater attention to global governance has also led to
stronger critiques based on its democratic deficit, weak accountability
mechanisms, and lack of judicial control. Additionally, calls for checks along the
6
lines of domestic models have grown over the years. Such critiques are
especially pronounced among developing countries where, for years, many have
perceived international institutions—especially the international financial
institutions and the United Nations (UN) Security Council—as tools of
domination for the Global North and have sought to create greater autonomous
7
policy space.
These developments have provoked calls for a more principled approach to
the definition and allocation of powers to institutions beyond the state. Such an
approach should not be overly restrictive: international authority, despite its
recent expansion, is still comparatively weak, especially in light of the
magnitude of transboundary challenges. Yet this principled approach would
need to balance a strong demand for international authority with concerns
about politicization, democracy and the rule of law, and Western dominance.
3. See, e.g., WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE? (Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore & Susan K.
Sell eds., 2010).
4. See David Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (1987).
5. See Michael Zürn, Martin Binder & Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, International Authority and Its
Politicization, 4 INT’L THEORY 69 (2012).
6. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 3, 2005, at 15.
7. See Amitav Acharya, Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism, and
Rule-Making in the Third World, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 95 (2011); Bhupinder Singh Chimni, International
Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004).
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A variety of normative principles have been proposed to guide the
allocation of global authority. The classical criterion is the consent of
contracting states: if states consensually decide to jointly exercise authority in a
given issue area, their consent also establishes the appropriateness of the newly
8
constituted international authority. This principle is easy to operationalize, but
it does not offer any substantive guidance. Further, it fails to address situations
in which consensual procedures are too slow and cumbersome to adapt the
powers of international institutions to changing circumstances. As institutional
action operates with increasing distance from initial delegation, or is not based
9
on delegation at all, the usefulness of consent declines further.
Weighing utilitarian considerations—sometimes based on the criterion of
10
“comparative benefit,” the idea of global public goods, or the Pareto
principle—provides an alternative normative principle that suggests decisions
should be allocated to the institution that can ensure the most effective
11
provision of welfare. Utility or efficiency is difficult to assess, however:
assessments tend to suffer from significant cognitive uncertainty, and utility, a
social construction, tends to vary strongly among the participants of global
governance institutions.
Other approaches have a democratic origin. Some of these approaches
suggest that the possibility of democratic self-governance exists only on the
national level and thus favor national decisionmaking and control over
international cooperation. Others emphasize democratic quality—the potential
for participation, communication, and inclusiveness—and tend to be skeptical
12
about global institutions for this reason. Cosmopolitan democrats, on the other
hand, argue that the scope of decisions and those who are affected by them
13
should be as congruent as possible. Moving decisions from domestic to
international institutions is then regarded as warranted if policy problems
extend beyond state borders, often resulting in calls for a substantial transfer of
14
powers from the domestic to the international sphere.

8. For an emphasis on consent in the political philosophy debate, see Tom Christiano, The
Legitimacy of International Institutions, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
380 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012).
9. See Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods,
108 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).
10. Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405, 422 (2006).
11. See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 35–38 (1972) (discussing this theory in the
federal context).
12. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 69 (2004); Robert A. Dahl, Can International
Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in DEMOCRACY’S EDGES 19 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano
Hacker-Cordon eds., 1999).
13. See, e.g., HELD, supra note 1; Robert E. Goodin, Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its
Alternatives, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 40, 65–66 (2007).
14. See Michael Zürn, Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other
International Institutions, 6 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 183 (2000).
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A fourth set of substantive approaches builds on conceptions of justice.
Defenders of cosmopolitan justice—with a strong emphasis of moral obligations
beyond borders—often favor global authority: they justify the creation of strong
supra-state institutions as instrumentally necessary in order to ensure
compliance with transboundary obligations of justice, including obligations of
15
distributive justice. The idea of national responsibility has the opposite effect.
It does accept international authority in certain areas, most notably for the
protection of basic rights. It is much more skeptical, however, of transboundary
moral obligations and instead espouses the idea that national communities
16
should normally govern their own fate autonomously.
Subsidiarity shares with the latter approach a general presumption for
decisionmaking at the local level, but it can also be read as linked to other,
more centralizing approaches. In the next part, we trace some of these linkages
and clarify how the concept of “subsidiarity” as it is used throughout this issue.
III
THE CONCEPT OF SUBSIDIARITY
Subsidiarity has long had a variety of meanings, and the resulting vagueness
has only contributed to the appeal of the concept. As observers have noted, it is
17
a “slippery, multifaceted, and polysemic concept,” and the apparent consensus
on the importance of subsidiarity among a wide range of social and political
18
actors “has been gained only by obfuscation.” Although the most prominent
subsidiarity discourse today, that in the EU, mainly concerns the allocation of
powers between national and European institutions, other variants have
focused on the relation between state and society.
Catholic social thought, often seen as central to the modern rise of
19
subsidiarity as a political principle, employed subsidiarity to delineate spheres
in which government can and should act, while at the same time protecting
individuals and societal associations from what was regarded as excessive
intervention. And whereas this latter variant drew its inspiration from principles
of justice, others have drawn on ideas of liberty or economic efficiency in order
20
to justify the primacy of lower-level decisionmaking. Subsidiarity has been
conceptualized as part of very different approaches to allocating powers

15. See, e.g., SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY 148–88
(2005). On approaches to global distributive justice with other institutional consequences, see Michael
Blake & Patrick Taylor Smith, International Distributive Justice, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/international-justice/ (last visited Feb.
26, 2016).
16. DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 111–34 (2007).
17. Pierpaolo Donati, What Does “Subsidiarity” Mean? The Relational Perspective, 12 J. MKTS. &
MORALITY 211, 211 (2009).
18. Andreas Føllesdal, Survey Article: Subsidiarity, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 190, 190 (1998).
19. David Golemboski, Federalism and the Catholic Principle of Subsidiarity, 45 PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM 526 (2015).
20. See Føllesdal, supra note 18, at 200–07.
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between spheres of authority, and the divergence in foundations has also led to
significant divergence in interpretation. As a result, contestation reigns over not
only the strength and beneficiaries of subsidiarity but also the kinds of demands
subsidiarity makes on actors.
A. A Rebuttable Presumption for the Local
In order to retain conceptual clarity and make the concept of subsidiarity
useful both for analytical purposes and for normative guidance, we need to
specify in which sense we are using it here. The concept is unhelpful if it is
generically seen to include any principled allocation of powers between levels of
governance requiring “that powers should be allocated to the individual or
institution that can best exercise them” or if it is interpreted as merely an
21
unspecific preference for local action. These interpretations largely shift the
allocation of authority over to other approaches that consider where such
exercise might be “best” and thus deny subsidiarity an independent role. A
meaningful concept of subsidiarity needs multiple criteria for allocating
22
authority.
As a starting point, we understand subsidiarity as a rebuttable presumption
23
for the local —as a principle that requires decisionmaking to take place at a
lower level unless good reasons exist for shifting it upward. Our focus is on
vertical relations between governance institutions, that is, relations between
institutions with a different scope of authority. Because we are primarily
interested in the operation of subsidiarity in global governance, the most
obvious application is to the relations between national and (regional as well as
global) international institutions. Most contributions to this symposium adopt
this focus. Yet in principle, subsidiarity can also extend to relations with sub24
state governments in federal states, local institutions (such as cities), and
private forms of governance. For example, Peer Zumbansen’s article in this
issue focuses specifically on the problems created by applying subsidiarity in the
25
context of transnational private regulation. We exclude, however, relations of
a merely horizontal or lateral nature, such as between different international
21. Michelle Evans, The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Social and Political Principle in Catholic
Social Teaching, 3 SOLIDARITY: J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT & SECULAR ETHICS 44, 54 (2013); see also
Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Toward a Global Ethics of Trade Governance: Subsidiarity Writ
Large, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 259 (arguing subsidiarity is mainly about deference
to institutions with superior credentials).
22. See Thomas M. Franck, The Centripede and the Centrifuge: Principles for the Centralisation and
Decentralisation of Governance, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 19, 26–31 (Tomer Broude &
Yuval Shany eds., 2008).
23. Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity and International Human-Rights Courts: Respecting SelfGovernance and Protecting Human Rights—Or Neither?, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at
147, 148.
24. See Loren King, Cities, Subsidiarity, and Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY,
supra note 2, at 291.
25. See Peer Zumbansen, Happy Spells? Constructing and Deconstructing a Private-Law
Perspective on Subsidiarity, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 215.
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institutions, between states, or between institutions of private governance. The
directionality of the subsidiarity relation in such instances is less clear, and the
reasons for deference to one or the other institution (often taken to be
geographical or functional proximity) differ from those typically adduced for
vertical relationships.
Although subsidiarity generally favors local action, it can also turn into a
27
justification for higher-level decisionmaking. In this issue, Tomer Broude
28
focuses on this risk in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In
contrast with absolute principles of allocation, such as sovereignty, subsidiarity
contains only a presumption that can be rebutted with good reasons. The lower
the threshold for such “good reasons,” the more subsidiarity will facilitate
centralization; the higher the threshold, the more it will push toward
decentralization.
What counts as a good reason is, unsurprisingly, disputed between the
different versions of subsidiarity. Many approaches require greater
effectiveness in problemsolving—they require desired results to be better
achieved on the higher level, or action on the lower level to not be able to
(sufficiently) achieve them. Low administrative, financial, legal, or political
capacities of states may thus lead to calls for stronger involvement of
29
international institutions. The EU conception of subsidiarity follows this line.
30
Yet everything then hinges on the definition of the “desired results.”
Models of fiscal federalism, for example, accept only Pareto-improving central
measures that address negative externalities, while the Catholic social tradition
allows for measures that pursue goals of distributive justice and may leave
certain units worse off. Some approaches leave the definition of goals to the
31
sub-units, and others grant the central level a stronger role in this respect. As a
result, the principle of subsidiarity, if insufficiently specified, can appear to do
little actual work, being a mere placeholder for substantive conceptions of the
proper distribution of powers between different levels of government.

26. But see CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 211–26 (2008); Claus
Kress, Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit international, 4 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 561, 579 (2006).
27. See Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time, 43
COMMON MKT L. REV. 63, 67–72 (2006).
28. See Tomer Broude, Selective Subsidiarity and Dialectic Deference in the World Trade
Organization, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 53.
29. See Isobel Roele, Sidelining Subsidiarity: United Nations Security Council “Legislation” and Its
Infra-Law, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016.
30. On this problem in the EU context, see Nicholas W. Barber, The Limited Modesty of
Subsidiarity, 11 EUR. L. J. 308, 318 (2005); Davies, supra note 27, at 78.
31. See Andreas Føllesdal, Competing Conceptions of Subsidiarity, in FEDERALISM AND
SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at 214, 219–24.
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B. Subsidiarity, Weak and Strong
In order to avoid such a conflation, it is useful to think of two ideal types of
subsidiarity with very dissimilar degrees of analytical independence. A weak
version is characterized by an easily rebuttable presumption—a presumption for
the local that provides a low threshold and can be overcome by any reason that
makes action on a higher level appear advantageous, be it for the sake of
efficiency, efficacy, or justice. A strong version of subsidiarity, in contrast, is
characterized by a high threshold—a presumption in favor of local governance
that can be rebutted only by strong reasons in exceptional cases. Such reasons
may lie in qualified negative externalities or justice considerations that may
apply to certain circumscribed situations. It is only in such a strong version that
subsidiarity remains relatively independent from other principles for the
allocation of powers between different levels of governance.
Subsidiarity is distinctive only when it acts as a trump—when it trumps
certain good reasons for scaling governance up—and, as part V explains, the
principle has a significant impact only when it is treated as such a trump.
Practically, a strong version of subsidiarity might be grounded in the risk of
abuse by higher-level institutions; normatively, it may find its basis in
considerations of democracy or self-determination that may be seen to
outweigh other reasons in normal circumstances.
Thinking of subsidiarity in such strong terms may mean that it is not
appropriate for all issue areas—as discussed in part VI, there may be areas in
which a strong presumption in favor of the local is undesirable. Both empirically
and normatively, subsidiarity may play varying roles across the fields of global
governance: In some fields, it may come in a strong version; in others, it may
come in a weak version; in yet others, it may not come at all.
C. Bounded and Unbounded Contexts
Operationalizing subsidiarity depends largely on the institutional context in
which it operates. So far we have treated it as operating in an unbounded
fashion—as a principle for attributing powers to certain levels of government in
the abstract. Given the inevitable disagreement about the legitimate aims
against which reasons for scaling decisionmaking up could be measured,
however, the principle of subsidiarity will often be difficult to apply in such
unbounded contexts. It may operate more as a broad constitutional principle
with little scope for direct specification.
We may find the subsidiarity principle to be more effective in bounded
contexts: in situations in which the legitimate aims are institutionally
predefined, and in which subsidiarity operates within an existing frame (rather
than shoulders the construction of the frame itself). This is the typical context of
subsidiarity in federal and quasi-federal systems, where it is meant to guide the
exercise of certain, often-enumerated powers of the central level. The more
clearly specified the potential aims of centralization, the easier it is to apply
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subsidiarity, because the effects of decisionmaking at different levels can be
compared with a view to those aims.
Most contributions to this issue focus on cases of bounded subsidiarity. The
definition of the frame in which subsidiarity operates here will typically follow
principles other than subsidiarity. Procedurally, they may operate on a strictconsent basis; substantively, they may be guided by substantive principles
without any operation of a default rule. Subsidiarity’s scope is then limited to
filling the gaps in that frame.
The most heavily bounded context in which subsidiarity operates is that of
interpretation in judicial or quasi-judicial fora. Rather than weighing reasons for
one or the other site of decisionmaking, it is usually understood as implying
deference to the local level when the relevant norms leave room for competing
interpretations. The most prominent example in an international context is
probably the margin-of-appreciation doctrine used by the European Court of
32
Human Rights, yet we encounter similar techniques in other settings.
Interpreting an open text is usually not a technical enterprise, but one that
requires recourse to substantive arguments about “right” answers. Subsidiarity
thus may be seen to provide a presumption that fills the interpretative space,
but one that retains its rebuttable character as other reasons may, exceptionally,
militate against deference. Here, too, subsidiarity is limited to filling a frame—
an open-textured legal norm—constructed on the basis of other principles.
D. Allocation, Exercise, Interaction
Subsidiarity is typically understood primarily as a principle for allocating
powers to different levels of governance, yet it may also provide guidance on
how powers are to be exercised. For example, subsidiarity can be thought to
include an element of proportionality that requires powers to be exercised in a
way that is not more intrusive for lower levels than alternative ways to achieve
33
the same aim. Subsidiarity may also find expression in procedural mechanisms,
such as the involvement of national parliaments in the application of
subsidiarity in the EU legislative process, or certain forms of veto rights for
34
lower levels as against potential encroachments. Robert Howse and Kalypso
35
Nicolaïdis, in their contribution to this issue, highlight a significant number of
potential promoters of subsidiarity in the context of world trade law. If the
32. See, e.g., DEFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: STANDARD OF REVIEW
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION (Lukasz Gruszczynski & Wouter Werner eds., 2014); Yuval Shany,
Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907
(2005); see also Broude, supra note 28; Føllesdal, supra note 23 at 147; Howse & Nicolaïdis supra note
21; René Urueña, Subsidiarity and the Public–Private Distinction in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 79
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 99.
33. Isabel Feichtner, Subsidiarity, in 9 THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 653, 653 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2007).
34. See supra Part III.B; see also Xavier Groussot & Sanja Bogojević, Subsidiarity as a Procedural
Safeguard of Federalism, in THE QUESTION OF COMPETENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 234 (Loïc
Azoulay ed., 2014) (providing discussion related to the EU).
35. See generally Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra at note 21.
AND
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concept is to retain a distinctive shape, however, it should not include in its
purview all organizational and procedural devices that might favor the local
level, or that might facilitate interaction and dialogue between levels of
governance. As a default rule for the distribution of decision-making powers,
subsidiarity is primarily an allocative principle.
IV
EXPERIENCES WITH SUBSIDIARITY: FEDERAL STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION
Although the discussion on subsidiarity in global governance is only
beginning, it is tempting to look at the experiences of federal states and the EU.
These systems have a longer history of conflicts over the allocation, exercise,
and adjudication of powers and should therefore be sources of inspiration for
the application of subsidiarity in global governance. In federal states, however,
subsidiarity, understood as an explicit constitutional principle that can be
enforced by courts, plays a surprisingly marginal role. The Australian, Brazilian,
Canadian, and U.S. constitutions do not contain explicit references to
subsidiarity. The German constitution mentions subsidiarity only with respect
to German participation in the EU, but not explicitly as an organizing principle
36
for domestic federalism. However, it does contain a functionally equivalent
provision, which links the adoption of federal legislation in areas of concurrent
powers to criteria such as “the establishment of equivalent living conditions” or
37
“the maintenance of legal or economic unity.” Only the Swiss federal
constitution, as revised in 1999 and later, mentions subsidiarity both as a broad
38
general principle and in a specific article on the powers of the federal level. On
the whole, therefore, subsidiarity seems to play only a small role in constitutions
39
of federal states.
There are several potential reasons for this relatively low number of explicit
appearances of subsidiarity in federal constitutions. Many suggest that
subsidiarity is not a specific principle achieving a clearly defined goal that could
be contrasted with other such principles. Instead, it is a way of expressing the
fundamental problématique of federalism itself: how to balance unity and
diversity, with a preference for diversity rather than unity, in order to make
federations more democratic, more effective, and more adaptive. In that sense,
40
subsidiarity is “the soul of federalism.” In this view, however, subsidiarity is
36. GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION] May 23, 1949, art. 23, ¶ 1, (Ger.), translation at http://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html.
37. Id. art. 72, ¶ 2.
38. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 5a, 43a ¶ 1 (Switz.).
39. See also Jürgen Bröhmer, Subsidiarity and the German Constitution, in GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at 129; Michelle Evans, Subsidiarity and Federalism: A
Case Study of the Australian Constitution and Its Interpretation, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON
SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at 185; Augusto Zimmermann, Subsidiarity, Democracy and Individual
Liberty in Brazil, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at 85.
40. See Jenna Bednar, Subsidiarity and Robustness: Building the Adaptive Efficiency of Federal
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merely an expression of a preference for the local that leaves open how this is to
be achieved. In federal constitutions, other means seem to be more promising,
most notably the enumeration of powers for each level of government.
In the EU, subsidiarity has occupied an increasingly prominent place.
Introduced as a formal principle for the first time in the 1992 Maastricht
41
Treaty, it has since been constantly refined and extended with a view to
strengthening it. The EU is a highly interesting case for assessing the potential
of subsidiarity in global governance. Its legislative powers have continuously
increased in both scope and depth during the last six decades, even during the
42
“Eurocrisis.” At the same time, the EU has probably made a larger effort than
43
any other polity to put subsidiarity into practice.
The discovery of subsidiarity in the EU during the 1990s and the increased
attention given to it at least in some federal states might have been caused by
uneasiness with the steady growth of powers of the center. Germany has
embarked on a broader reform of its federal system in order to strengthen the
44
Länder. In Switzerland, the constitutional reforms of 1999 and subsequent
years were aimed at strengthening federal diversity, and it is in this context that
subsidiarity received greater attention. However, this broad movement also
shows the problems and limits of subsidiarity.
One possible function of subsidiarity is to guide the legislator. This is most
45
clearly the case in Switzerland and Germany. It is also Bermann’s
46
interpretation of U.S. constitutional traditions. The underlying rationale is that
subsidiarity essentially deals with political questions of power-sharing, which
should be left to the political process and should normally not be used by
constitutional courts to review legislative activity. The pervasive centralizing
tendencies in many federations as well as in the EU, however, indicate that
legislators at the higher level are not easy to tame. The logic here is the same as
in domestic or international “constitutional moments”: If decisionmakers have
the required majorities and the desire to strengthen central institutions, a

Systems, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at 231. This is also the main thrust of the
argument in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).
41. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 31 I.L.M. 247.
42. Philipp Genschel & Markus Jachtenfuchs, Conflict-Minimising Integration: How the EU
Achieves Massive Integration Despite Massive Protest, in THE END OF THE EUROCRATS’ DREAM:
ADJUSTING TO EUROPEAN DIVERSITY 166 (Damian Chalmers, Markus Jachtenfuchs & Christian
Joerges eds., 2016).
43. For overviews, see Gabriel A. Moens & John Trone, Subsidiarity as Judicial and Legislative
Review Principles in the European Union, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2,
at 157; ANTONIO ESTELLA, THE EU PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND ITS CRITIQUE (2002).
44. See generally FRITZ W. SCHARPF, FÖDERALISMUSREFORM: KEIN AUSWEG AUS DER
POLITIKVERFLECHTUNGSFALLE? (2009).
45. Bröhmer, supra note 39, at 132.
46. See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 403 (1994).
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decentralizing principle such as subsidiarity needs independent safeguards in
order to be effective.
Courts are classical safeguards. By the very nature of their function,
however, courts enter the process very late. On the whole, they seem to be
rather reluctant to use the subsidiarity principle for striking down federal
legislation. The Supreme Court of Canada has on a few occasions referred to
the principle of subsidiarity, but its jurisprudence is often regarded as
strengthening the central government rather than the provinces, most notably
because it accords the criterion of efficiency a prominent place in
47
operationalizing subsidiarity. Since the mid-1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court has
48
become more active in adjudicating such issues. Still, the debate is about the
extent of limited Supreme Court involvement, not about a strong subsidiarity
watchdog. Even in the EU, which, contrary to the United States, has a legally
enforceable subsidiarity principle, scrutiny by the European Court of Justice
has not led to many practical results. According to Paul Craig, slightly over ten
49
cases in nearly twenty years presented a “real subsidiarity challenge.” Overall,
50
the assessment is rather skeptical.
Supreme courts in federations and in the EU are central-level institutions
and may have an inbuilt centralizing bias. For this reason, “safeguard
51
subsidiarity” —decentralized safeguards—often appears to be an attractive
option. The EU has tried to implement this idea by empowering national
parliaments. The most significant recent innovations are the “yellow card” and
“orange card” procedures, by which a third (and at a second stage, half) of
member-state parliaments can temporarily block a legislative proposal and
52
force the Commission to review it on the basis of concerns about subsidiarity.
The most important result so far is the withdrawal of a Commission
proposal for a Council regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective
53
action after objections by twelve national parliaments. But one should be
cautious in expecting too much from this safeguard: In parliamentary systems,
which are the overwhelming majority in the EU, cases in which the
parliamentary majority will not support “its” government are likely to be rare

47. See Jean Leclair, The Supreme Court of Canada’s Understanding of Federalism: Efficiency at
the Expense of Diversity, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 411 (2003); see also Eugénie Brouillet, Canadian Federalism
and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Should We Open Pandora’s Box?, 54 SUP. CT. L. REV. 601 (2011).
48. See Steven G. Calabresi & Lucy D. Bickford, Federalism and Subsidiarity: Perspectives from
U.S. Constitutional Law, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at 123.
49. Paul P. Craig, Subsidiarity, a Political and Legal Analysis, 50 J. COMMON MKT. STUD.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 72, 80 (2012).
50. Id. at 84.
51. Bednar, supra note 40, at 241–50.
52. For a comprehensive evaluation of the experiences with these procedures see PHILIPP KIIVER,
THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY (2012).
53. Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Exercise of the Right to Take Collective Action
within the Context of the Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom to Provide Services, COM
(2012) 130 final (Mar. 21, 2012).
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54

and limited to extreme cases. Still, because these procedures are relatively new
and entail a partial substantive change from established practices, participants
find their way into them slowly. On the whole, it seems the EU’s involvement of
national parliaments is moderately successful, and more successful than
55
entrusting the European Court of Justice with subsidiarity control.
The wording of the subsidiarity principle in the EU is also problematic. The
Treaty on European Union, in its current version, provides: “the Union shall act
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
56
sufficiently achieved by the Member States.” It implies that there is agreement
about the goals or objectives of a planned action and, by making effectiveness
the main criterion for the allocation of tasks to a specific level, reflects a weak
57
version of the subsidiarity principle. But in a heterogeneous social and
institutional setting, goals will often be neither clear nor consensual. If central
European institutions have the last word in defining these goals, their
institutional self-interests in increasing powers and resources may well prevail.
Moreover, if effectiveness of (potential) problemsolving is chosen as the
primary criterion, this will likely have a centralizing effect because many policy
externalities and collective goals can indeed be better dealt with at the higher
58
level—especially the EU’s prime goal, the completion of the internal market.
The Swiss constitution adopts much stronger wording according to which “[t]he
Federation only undertakes tasks that the Cantons are unable to perform or
59
which require uniform regulation by the Federation.” Still, it is uncertain
60
whether this really limits federal encroachment upon cantonal powers.
From this short discussion of federal states and the EU, we learn several
things. First, subsidiarity is only one among several devices for assuring a
preference for lower-level decisionmaking. Its practical scope in federal states
as well as in the EU—which has spent enormous energy in implementing it—is
limited, and it needs to be coupled with other safeguards in order to be
effective. Second, courts are of limited use in “enforcing” the subsidiarity
principle upon legislators because the courts tend to consider subsidiarity to be
a political question outside of their scope for adjudication and because the
criteria for the application of subsidiarity are often vaguely defined. Third,
lower-level parliaments may be rather effective in limiting higher-level
legislative activity but are also bound by their interest to support their own

54. SERGIO FABBRINI, WHICH EUROPEAN UNION? EUROPE AFTER THE EURO CRISIS 145
(2015).
55. KIIVER, supra note 52, at 148.
56. Treaty on European Union, supra note 41.
57. On the distinction between weak and strong versions, see Part III.B supra.
58. A point made forcefully by Davies, supra note 27.
59. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 43a, ¶ 1 (Switz.).
60. Regula Kägi-Diener, Current Challenges Faced by Swiss Federalism, in 1 THE WAYS OF
FEDERALISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE HORIZONS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN SPAIN
333, 341 (Alberto López-Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San Epifanio eds., 2013).
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government. Finally, notions of subsidiarity that assume agreement on the
problem to be solved are inherently problematic in heterogeneous systems.
V
TRAJECTORIES OF SUBSIDIARITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Subsidiarity is leaving traces in many fields of global governance, but as the
contributions to this issue show, these traces have very different strengths in
different contexts. It is thus important to get a clearer picture of where and
under what conditions subsidiarity is likely to emerge and evolve. This part
develops some theoretically grounded conjectures about the trajectories of
subsidiarity in global governance, on the basis of a few simple assumptions
about the demand for subsidiarity (that is, constellations in which subsidiarity
would be useful and may be requested by some actors), its supply (that is, the
conditions under which subsidiarity is actually provided), and the conditions for
its effectiveness. These conjectures reflect observations advanced in the
different contributions to this symposium, but they provide starting points for
further work, rather than firm conclusions.
A. The Demand for Subsidiarity in Multilevel Systems
On the most general level, the emergence of subsidiarity in global
governance typically responds to a need of finding organizing principles that go
“beyond consent” in a world in which policymaking increasingly rests with
regional and international bodies. The formal powers of these bodies, often
vaguely defined, tend to provide only limited institutional guidance and will
often be further diluted as a regime evolves over time. National governments
and other domestic actors are likely to demand new safeguards as they evolve.
According to René Urueña, the extent to which new safeguards are developed
depends more on how actors interpret the rise of international public authority
61
than on international bodies’ “real” authority.
Based on these thoughts, our first conjecture is that the more global
governance is considered by states and domestic actors to be a vertical multilevel
system, with significant authority located at the global level, the more likely
subsidiarity is to be in demand as a tool for containing the expansion of this
authority. Challenges of the UN Security Council’s expanding authority, as
62
63
discussed in the contributions by Isobel Roele and Machiko Kanetake,
exemplify this just as much as the extensive, and still recent, contestation over
64
the international investment regime which, as shown by René Urueña, is
fueled by the increasing recognition of the “public authority” of investment
tribunals (and the need to develop a “public law” response).
61. Urueña, supra note 32, at 100–01.
62. See Roele, supra note 29, at 189.
63. See Machiko Kanetake, Subsidiarity in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 79
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 165.
64. Urueña, supra note 32, at 116.
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In such multilevel systems, the interest of governments in limiting higherlevel decisionmaking through principles such as subsidiarity is likely to depend
on the degree of political control they can exercise over outcomes. If memberstate unanimity is required, or if states enjoy ample veto power, subsidiarity is
not needed, at least from the perspective of national executives. This changes as
decisionmaking moves away from member states or becomes subject to
(qualified) majority rule. The demand for subsidiarity is thus likely to arise
when states pool their powers and exercise them jointly, as occurs, for example,
in political bodies such as the UN Security Council or the International
Monetary Fund Executive Board.
The demand for subsidiarity will be even greater when states delegate
65
authority to independent bodies with substantial discretion to decide.
Similarly, one can expect a stronger demand when institutions that do not
operate on the basis of delegation make consequential decisions, as is the case
for private authorities. A second conjecture is thus that demand for subsidiarity
grows with the distance from state consent, and that it is higher in cases of
delegated authority than in cases of pooled authority. For example, Andreas von
Staden’s discussion of regional trade integration in various settings suggests
that, in the absence of properly supranational elements, calls for
66
decentralization or subsidiarity tend to remain weak.
Whether a demand is triggered will also depend on the way in which global
authority is exercised. Domestic actors, such as parliaments, political parties,
business associations, or civil society groups, pay attention to action by
international or transnational institutions mainly when they see that their
67
interests or values are directly at stake. This will often be the case when global
institutions not only make rules but also apply them to particular cases, as is
typically the case for judicial bodies. In contrast to earlier periods, when
international norms provided space for specification by national political and
legal systems, the proliferation of international courts and tribunals and their
often expansionary, evolutionary interpretation of international rules have
reduced this space, provoking counterclaims for self-restraint and deference in
order to safeguard national autonomy. A third conjecture is thus that demand
for subsidiarity grows when acts of global governance institutions are highly
intrusive and concern specific cases. The European Court of Human Rights and
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the focus of the contributions by Andreas
68
69
Føllesdal and Tomer Broude, are prime examples.
65. For a conceptual as well as empirical discussion of pooling and delegation, see Liesbet Hooghe
& Gary Marks, Delegation and Pooling in International Organizations, 10 REV. INT’L ORGS. 305
(2015).
66. Andreas von Staden, Subsidiarity in Regional Integration Regimes in Latin America and Africa,
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 27, 44 (discussing subsidiarity and the Economic
Community of West African States).
67. Zürn, Binder & Ecker-Ehrhardt, supra note 5.
68. See Føllesdal, supra note 23.
69. See Broude, supra note 28.
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B. The Limited Supply of Subsidiarity
Yet even where there is demand for subsidiarity, its supply—the actual
establishment of a subsidiarity norm in an institutional setting—may be limited.
This is due, in part, to the interest structure behind a given regime. When global
decisionmaking is giving effect to reciprocal bargains, or seeking to deal with
negative externalities of domestic decisionmaking, states interested in the
positive effects of the regime will likely resist subsidiarity. This may be the case,
for example, in trade and investment, where states that see themselves as
overall beneficiaries reject what they see as a loosening of the standards for
others through greater deference to domestic policies. Isabel Feichtner’s
account of the challenges of introducing subsidiarity concerns into the
70
decisionmaking of political bodies in the WTO draws attention to such
constraints.
The situation is different when regimes do not deal with significant
externalities, as is the case, for example, for human rights regimes or
international criminal justice. In these contexts, states bind themselves rather
71
than others, have a less direct interest in compliance by others, and are less
likely to resist subsidiarity as a guiding principle. We thus formulate a fourth
conjecture: The supply of subsidiarity will be higher in regimes dealing with
issues without international repercussions than for institutions regulating actual
or potential negative externalities.
The effect of this limitation is greatest when the benefits of a regime accrue
asymmetrically to powerful countries. Powerful states may strongly resist the
application of the subsidiarity principle in the operation of an institution
because they have a vested interest in the constraints it places on other
countries’ freedom of action. This is apparent, for example, in the international
investment protection regime: as long as this regime was perceived to burden
primarily developing countries, there was great resistance to subsidiarity by the
main beneficiaries—the powerful economies of the Global North. As the latter,
too, are increasingly subject to investment disputes, openness to subsidiarity has
increased and, as René Urueña demonstrates, struggles over the degree of
72
deference due to local institutions have intensified. The fifth conjecture
suggests that subsidiarity tends to not be supplied if a powerful actor is strongly
interested in the constraints on other countries imposed by a uniform
interpretation of the regime’s rules.
70. See Isabel Feichtner, Subsidiarity in the World Trade Organization: The Promise of Waivers, 79
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 75, 82–84.
71. On this distinction, see Karen J. Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs.
Other-Binding Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2008, at 37. On the self-binding
character of the European human rights regime, see Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights
Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 (2000).
72. See, e.g., Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law, 54 VA. J.
INT’L L. 545, 555–58 (2014); William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a
Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 296
(2010); Urueña, supra note 32.
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When authority is delegated to, or exercised by, bodies with a certain level
73
of autonomy, the control by states may be limited or indirect. This may be
especially so for institutions acting as trustees, rather than as agents of states, as
74
is often the case for independent courts or dispute settlement bodies. The
supply of subsidiarity by such institutions will thus follow a different logic and is
likely to depend on the degree to which they are vulnerable to, and need to
accommodate, challenges by national governments and domestic actors. The
European human rights regime, for example, developed its “margin of
appreciation” doctrine in the early days when it was weak—well before it found
75
broad recognition and intensified its scrutiny of member states’ policies.
Along these lines, we may formulate a sixth conjecture according to which
central institutions with significant and stable institutional and political autonomy
are likely to be reluctant suppliers of subsidiarity. Andreas Føllesdal notes that
this conjecture may not sit well with the continuing use of the margin
appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights up until the present—
though this use may be due, precisely, to the renewed challenges the Court
76
faces over its expansionary jurisprudence. On the other hand, Jorge Contesse’s
contribution on the inter-American human rights regime describes institutions
that, despite their weak authority, refused from the start to accept a subsidiarity
77
principle to maintain the moral high ground over authoritarian governments.
Both accounts urge unpacking the sources of authority on which independent
institutions rest in detail.
Although generalizations are difficult, it is clear that subsidiarity’s demand
is typically higher than its supply. Subsidiarity is not in demand everywhere. In
environmental policy, for instance, most institutions are weak and do not trigger
significant challenges. Yet for many other areas in which global authority has
grown in strength and scope over the last decades, a demand for subsidiarity
will likely be observable, even though its supply may not be forthcoming
because of the resistance by strong states or veto players.

73. See Hooghe & Marks, supra note 65, at 307. On the informal influence of powerful countries,
see, for example, RANDALL W. STONE, CONTROLLING INSTITUTIONS:
INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2011); Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation and Power
in International Organization: the Operational Constitution and Its Critics, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 209
(2009).
74. See Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context, 14 EUR.
J. INT’L REL. 33, 35 (2008).
75. On the evolution of the Court, see Mikael Rask Madsen, The Protracted Institutionalization of
the Strasbourg Court: From Legal Diplomacy to Integrationist Jurisprudence, in THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 43 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael Rask
Madsen eds., 2011).
76. Føllesdal, supra note 23 at 162–63.
77. Jorge Contesse, Contestation and Deference in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 79
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016.
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C. Effectiveness
Even if subsidiarity is accepted in a given institutional setting, it will not
necessarily have a significant effect on the allocation of powers, especially as a
tool of decentralization. As we have already seen in the EU context,
subsidiarity often appears to observers as a fig leaf, unable to halt centralization
processes, yet providing them with a veneer of acceptability.
Whether or not the principle has teeth will depend, in part, on its
formulation. As mentioned above, if used in a weak sense—with a low
threshold for countervailing, centralizing reasons—subsidiarity is likely to
remain relatively inconsequential, simply because it provides too much leeway
for actors to employ their own criteria in determining where an issue may be
handled most “effectively.” As Tomer Broude notes in his contribution, the
flexible principles governing deference in the WTO dispute settlement context
represent not so much a rule or principle as a “discursive device of negotiation
over power and authority among a multiplicity of actors, pulling and pushing in
78
different directions.” This impression is yet stronger in those contexts that, like
79
the African regional integration regimes analyzed by Andreas von Staden,
employ explicitly open and vague formulations of subsidiarity. One may thus
assume, as a seventh conjecture, that weak formulations of subsidiarity are
unlikely to have a significant decentralizing effect.
The effects of subsidiarity will largely depend, therefore, on the institutions
that interpret the principle and give it meaning. The experience in federal
systems, and in the EU, points to a very limited role of central institutions,
especially central courts, as guardians of subsidiarity—central bodies tend to
80
protect the authority of the central level. As a result, the EU has empowered
national parliaments to exercise this role, with a potentially greater effect. In the
global context, similarly complex procedures are unlikely to be established, but
domestic bodies such as courts or parliaments may perform similar functions
when they hold the keys to compliance with decisions by international bodies.
Thus, national and regional courts have pushed central decision-making
bodies—the UN Security Council, the WTO dispute settlement system, or the
81
European Court of Human Rights—to move closer to their views. Machiko
Kanetake, in her contribution to this symposium, focuses precisely on this
82
mechanism with a view to the UN sanctions regime. We thus formulate an
eighth conjecture that subsidiarity is likely to have stronger decentralizing effects
if lower-level actors play a significant role in its interpretation and policing.

78. Broude, supra note 28, at 73.
79. See von Staden, supra note 66, at 39–50.
80. See Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary, in THE
OXFORD HANDOOK OF LAW & POLITICS 142, 160 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen &
Gregory A. Caldeira eds., 2008).
81. See NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF
POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010).
82. Kanetake, supra note 63.
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Not all settings are equally suited to the application of principles on the
allocation of powers. In multilevel systems, in which different levels of
government enjoy formal decision-making powers, such principles find
relatively easy application. The situation is more difficult in less clearly defined
institutional contexts, in which responsibilities may be shared rather than
distributed and in which policymaking does not occur through identifiable
decisions but instead occurs in multi-actor processes without clear cut-off
points. Many areas of global governance are of this latter character—they are
83
“governance without government,” operating through soft tools and through
the interaction of multiple, only loosely coupled spheres of authority of a
84
domestic as well as transnational and international kind.
The decision-making structures are not fixed in this case but dynamically
adapt to the social and political environment, often resulting in forms of
85
authority that may better be described as “liquid” than “solid.” In such
contexts, subsidiarity can hardly be anchored in an institutional framework or
targeted at particular decisions or actors. Informal tools often appear less
intrusive than formally binding decisions, but as Isobel Roele’s contribution
shows, they may also serve to subvert the constraints imposed by formal
86
structures. In her account, the UN Security Council’s turn to cooperative
implementation and best practices (rather than coercive tools) created
“disciplines” for member states that escaped the principled approach of
87
subsidiarity. Similar challenges exist in many other areas of global governance,
from financial regulation to environmental affairs; applying subsidiarity to the
formal side of the governance structure might simply miss the target. Building
on this argument, our ninth conjecture states that subsidiarity is likely to be
more effective as a principle for formal, concentrated decisionmaking, rather than
as guidance for the more liquid contexts of global governance.
D. Subsidiarity in Law
Even when it is supplied, however, subsidiarity tends to have a different
complexion in global governance than in other multilevel systems. In federal
states (insofar as subsidiarity exists) and in the EU, subsidiarity can provide an
overarching legal principle, a common norm with legal effects on all levels. In
the global sphere, however, this is rendered difficult by the very structure of the
83. See generally GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD
POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
84. See also Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7
PERSP. ON POL. 13, 15–21 (2009).
85. Nico Krisch, Authority, Solid and Liquid, in the Postnational Sphere, in AUTHORITY IN
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY (R. Cotterrell & M. del Mar, eds.) (forthcoming August
2016)(using “liquidity” to refer to forms of authority that are informal, rely on substantive groundings,
and are characterized by multiplicity and dynamism).
86. See Roele, supra note 29, at 204–14 (conducting a case study of the Financial Action Task
Force and concluding that the resulting disciplinary infra-law hinders national control in some
respects).
87. Id.
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international legal order. Usually conceived of as separate from domestic law,
international law cannot directly impose binding rules on domestic actors, nor
can domestic law formally impose rules on international institutions. As a
result, an international rule for the allocation of powers may sit alongside a
competing rule in the domestic legal order, leading to institutional contestation
over the general principle guiding the allocation.
This problem is exacerbated because the number of legal orders, and the
overlaps between them, are growing even on the international plane, thus
sustaining a trend toward fragmentation and a properly “pluralist” postnational
88
legal order. Subsidiarity may find increasing acceptance as a legal principle,
89
especially in the form of a national margin of appreciation, but it remains
confined to certain issue areas and institutions.
As the contributions to this symposium show, subsidiarity is strong in the
European but not in the inter-American human rights system; it is established,
to some extent, in international trade while still highly contested in
international investment law; it is a pillar of European integration but hardly
present in other regional integration regimes; and it is present in merely limited
traces in the context of international security. The trajectories of these issue
areas vary widely, and it is unlikely that subsidiarity will consolidate into a
90
general principle of international law any time soon. Subsidiarity, as any norm
governing relations between sites of governance, will then have only partial
application—it may regulate the relations of one of those sites to its
environment, but it is unable to make a claim to regulating these relations
comprehensively for all sites involved—unless one takes a strong normative
91
approach to the interpretation of global law.
In this fragmented order, some consolidation may result from an
establishment of subsidiarity norms in all these different sites, drawing on
92
“multi-sourced equivalent norms” and potentially leading to converging

88. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and
Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2007); Krisch, supra note 81.
89. See, e.g., Mireille Delmas-Marty & Marie-Laure Izorche, Marge nationale d’appréciation et
internationalisation du droit: réflexions sur la validité formelle d’un droit commun pluraliste, 46 MCGILL
L.J. 923 (2001) (discussing the emergence and foundations of the margin of appreciation as a guiding
principle in a pluralist order); Shany, supra note 32 (discussing the status of the margin of appreciation
in international law); Andreas von Staden, The Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review Beyond the
State: Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards of Review, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1023 (2012)
(discussing the margin of appreciation and subsidiarity as principles for determining standards of
review in international courts).
90. See DEFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 32; Feichtner,
supra note 33, at 17.
91. For such an approach, see Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On
the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and Beyond the State, in RULING THE WORLD?
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 258 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff &
Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
92. See MULTI-SOURCED EQUIVALENT NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Tomer Broude &
Yuval Shany eds., 2011).
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interpretations over time. Such a convergence will, however, remain
contingent and dependent on a cooperative stance of the political and judicial
bodies that take part in the interpretative process. Institutionally, convergence
is difficult to ensure without a substantial transformation toward a vertically
and horizontally integrated, federal-style multilevel system.
VI
THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR SUBSIDIARITY
Subsidiarity has traditionally been defended on a variety of normative
grounds. Individual liberty, efficiency, justice, democracy, self-determination,
political accountability, and respect for social and cultural diversity have been
94
put forward by different traditions of thought. These grounds reflect divergent
visions of the proper allocation of authority—discussed in part II—and they
have widely varying implications for the strength and scope of subsidiarity in
global governance.
A. Normative Grounds
Economic efficiency is often put forward as a ground for subsidiarity, based
on the assumption that proximity to the issue, availability of local information,
lower experimentation costs, and a greater potential for innovation create a
95
preference for lower-level decisionmaking. Such grounding yields only a weak
version of subsidiarity, because the preference for the local can easily be
overcome when a higher level is more effective at problem solving, or can solve
problems at a lower cost. For transboundary problems, this will often be the
case, because the production of externalities, coordination problems, and
economies of scale tend to render decentralized action costly. As has been
observed even for the relatively weak subsidiarity principle in the EU, a
preference for local decisions can have significant negative effects on regulatory
96
efficacy. Unlike in some domestic contexts, efficiency is hardly appropriate as
a key criterion in the global realm where diverse societies and political systems
pursue different aims—differences that deserve respect but that a focus on
comparative efficiency suppresses.
In contrast, culturalist or nationalist claims, or those based on respect for
value pluralism or an idea of self-determination of groups and peoples, tend to
ground a strong version of subsidiarity, in which higher-level decisionmaking is
admissible only in narrow circumstances. This reflects a more pluralist than
solidarist vision of international society, with an emphasis on citizens’ interest in
realizing their values, ideas, or ways of life free from outside intervention—
93. See, for example, the parallel subsidiarity guarantees in Article 6 of the Treaty on European
Union and Article 23 of the German Basic Law regarding European integration.
94. Bermann, supra note 46; Føllesdal, supra note 18.
95. See generally Aurélian Portuese, The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Principle of Economic
Efficiency, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 231 (2011); Calabresi & Bickford, supra note 48, at 128–37.
96. Craig, supra note 49, at 85.
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somewhat analogous to multiculturalist theories for diverse domestic societies.
Howse and Nicolaïdis take a similar path with a view to international trade
98
99
law, but the thrust of the idea is not limited to this field.
Similar results often stem from democracy arguments that emphasize the
greater strength of democratic processes on a smaller scale, given the potential
for communication and deliberation and the proximity of decisionmakers and
100
participants in the process. The result is a strong preference for the local in
these areas, at least insofar as local decisionmaking can make a good claim to
accordance with democratic principles. Along these lines, Contesse calls for a
turn toward subsidiarity in the inter-American human rights system in response
101
to the improved democratic pedigree of its member states. This strong
presumption for the local is mitigated, however, for cosmopolitan democrats
whose decisions should, along the lines of the congruence principle, be taken at
a level that includes all individuals that are significantly affected by such
102
decisions. In this framework, the case for subsidiarity with respect to
103
transboundary problems may be considerably weaker.
Here, too, the strength of the case for subsidiarity will depend on the quality
of decisionmaking at the different levels. For cosmopolitan democrats, the
democratic quality of international institutions will calibrate their weight in the
overall structure. Also, from other perspectives, institutions with a less inclusive
or representative pedigree, even if endowed with formal powers through
delegation, will be expected to practice greater deference to the domestic level
104
than those fulfilling higher institutional standards. For most international
institutions in existence, with all their deficits regarding responsiveness to the
diverse world public, this consideration suggests a strong version of subsidiarity.
B. Countervailing Reasons
On the basis of these considerations, there is a plausible initial case for
strong subsidiarity in global governance. Reasons that stem from culturalism
97. See Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, 9 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 209 (1980); BRAD ROTH, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT (2011). On
multicultural theory, see WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS (1996). On pluralism and solidarism, see ANDREW HURRELL, ON GLOBAL
ORDER: POWER, VALUES, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2007).
98. See Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 21, at 262 (exploring a “global trade ethics”).
99. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Epistemic Subsidiarity—Coexistence, Cosmopolitanism,
Constitutionalism, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 133 (2013) (adopting a pluralist vision of international society in
the context of risk governance).
100. See, e.g., Habermas, supra note 12; Kumm, supra note 91; von Staden, supra note 66.
101. See Contesse, supra note 77.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 12–14.
103. See also Kumm, supra note 91; Raffaele Marchetti, Models of Global Democracy in Defence of
Cosmo-federalism, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 22, 39–42
(Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 2011); Andreas L. Paulus, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and Democracy:
Towards the Demise of General International Law?, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 193, 195–96 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008).
104. For an argument of this kind, see Krisch, supra note 81, at 70–105.
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and value pluralism typically converge with arguments stemming from
democracy, especially accounting for the limited institutional legitimacy of most
global institutions. Strong subsidiarity does not imply, however, that decisions
should not be taken at the global level at all. Yet allocating powers to the global
level, or filling the space opened up by prior delegation, requires strong reasons.
A simple reference to greater economic efficiency, effectiveness in
problemsolving, or the transboundary character of a problem—as in weak
versions of subsidiarity—does not suffice.
One reason for upscaling is consent, which leaves defining the frame of
cooperation in the hands of the sub-units and may lead to an application of
subsidiarity in the interpretation of the terms of that consent. Normatively, the
strength of such consent will often depend on the processes used to achieve it;
inclusive, participatory processes with a parliamentary focus more strongly
justify higher-level decisionmaking than merely executive ones, which still tend
105
to be common in international institutions.
Another reason for scaling up decisions is often found in considerations of
justice, which are supposed to be removed from the disposition of sub-units.
Their extent may be relatively clear when it comes to direct violations of the
harm principle through physical transboundary effects, such as violence or
environmental harm. Mattias Kumm’s article in this symposium elaborates
further and shows how “justice-sensitive externalities” challenge claims of states
106
to be bound only with their specific consent. Less clarity reigns when it comes
to indirect harm, which may occur, for example, through the establishment of
107
an economic structure with benefits for some and severe costs for others. And
yet less agreement exists on questions of global distributive justice—
transboundary solidarity obligations, often seen as part of a cosmopolitan
108
framework. Specifying obligations in such controversial cases requires a
109
political process, but one that cannot take place solely on the national or the
global level.
C. Different Areas
As becomes apparent from the considerations above, the arguments for
subsidiarity vary significantly across issue areas. In some areas they point to
lower-level, and in other areas to higher-level, decisionmaking. It thus appears

105. Michael Zürn, Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 260,
262 (2004).
106. Mattias Kumm, Sovereignty and the Right to Be Left Alone: Subsidiarity, Justice-Sensitive
Externalities, and the Proper Domain of the Consent Requirement in International Law, 79 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016.
107. See THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 97–123 (2008).
108. See Charles R. Beitz, Justice and International Relations, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 360 (1975); see
also JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED” 113–19
(2001).
109. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 82–131 (1992) .
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sensible to operate with different specifications of subsidiarity—different
default rules—for different issue areas, depending on what kind of prima facie
case can be made. As always, the general rule may be rebutted in particular
circumstances, but subsidiarity can prove its utility by providing an issuespecific argumentation frame that shifts the burden of argument.
If the general default rule is strong subsidiarity, there are still areas that
warrant global decisions. This is the case when clear arguments from justice
require going beyond national decisions, as in international security or global
environmental affairs, insofar as they deal with direct harm inflicted across
boundaries. In such areas, one may want to apply a weak version of subsidiarity,
with a low threshold for justifying decisionmaking in a particular case. Yet this
alleviation of the standard should cover only the core of these areas—policies
directly related to transboundary harm—and not adjacent or ancillary
questions.
On the other hand, there are areas in which reasons for upscaling
decisionmaking are not generally apparent. These concern issues of only local
or national concern, or those that affect outsiders in insignificant ways, as in
trade or investment where, as Kumm points out, there is little reason to
110
override domestic choices. Unless one subscribed to a merely economic case
for subsidiarity, upscaling decisionmaking on such matters has to be based
primarily on consent and delegation. In interpreting the terms of that consent, a
strong subsidiarity principle counsels deference—a point made forcefully in the
contributions by Feichtner on the political and by Howse and Nicolaïdis on the
111
quasi-judicial bodies of the WTO. In cases of interpretive doubt, domestic
policies should be granted respect, and trade internationalization should not be
regarded as requiring a harmonization of regulatory standards in loosely related
fields.
Between these issue areas, distinctions are often not watertight—many
questions straddle boundaries. And there are areas in which prima facie
considerations turn out to be ambiguous. This is especially the case for human
rights (and similarly for international criminal justice). Human rights are not
transboundary but instead benefit individuals and minorities within a given subunit; as a matter of morality, however, they are not at the disposal of (national
or international) politics. As with other questions of justice, the definition of
their scope and content (beyond a narrow, undisputed core) requires an active
112
process of lawmaking.
Yet as Føllesdal argues with a view to the European human rights regime,
especially for rights issues that are likely to be affected by biases in the national
political process—the rights of disadvantaged individuals and groups—this
113
process can hardly be left to the domestic level alone. This point is also at the
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Kumm, supra note 106, at 248.
See Feichtner, supra note 70; Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 21.
See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
See Føllesdal, supra note 23 at 150–53, 160–63; see also Neus Torbisco Casals, Multiculturalism,
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core of Zumbansen’s contribution, which highlights the dark side of
subsidiarity—its role in denying protection to vulnerable groups within the sub114
units. Zumbansen focuses on labor rights, which, in the global economy, are
often left to markets to regulate and police in the absence of strong institutions
at the international level (and given the weakness of many countries’ domestic
institutions vis-à-vis economic actors). The normative limits of applying
subsidiarity in areas strongly affected by considerations of rights and justice
become exceedingly clear in this context.
Overall, there are good normative reasons for a strong version of
subsidiarity as a general principle in global governance, but there is also
significant variation across issue areas, suggesting a relaxation of the standard
for areas with strong elements of transboundary justice. Moreover, subsidiarity
will often apply within a frame defined by consent and delegation, and thus its
scope and bounds will depend heavily on the terms of that frame. Subsidiarity
in global governance is therefore bound to be a highly variegated affair.
VII
CONCLUSION
Subsidiarity is leaving traces in many fields of global governance. Long
present in different forms in federal systems and the EU, it is now increasingly
invoked in global contexts in order to provide principled guidance for the
allocation of powers between different layers of governance. With this framing
article—and the symposium as a whole—we aim to reconstruct existing trends
and discourses and to identify the place and role subsidiarity has (and should
have) in global governance.
As a rebuttable presumption for the local, subsidiarity can be applied “in
any polity in which governmental authority is lodged at different vertical
115
levels.” It provides an argumentation framework, or a default rule, for
regulating the allocation and exercise of powers among the different levels.
Its most typical application concerns the exercise of autonomous
institutional powers: We can expect the demand for an inclusion of subsidiarity
as a guiding principle to grow with the strength, visibility, and specificity of
authority in global governance, and especially with the expansion of authority
over time beyond initial (often consensually adopted) frames. The supply of
subsidiarity, however, is likely to be uneven: although autonomous global
governance institutions may have incentives to respond to subsidiarity demands
in order to bolster their position and legitimacy, the inclusion or application of
subsidiarity as a decisional principle may be prevented by powerful actors with
stakes in the strength of the regime. Subsidiarity demands in global governance
have translated into practice in certain areas of international politics—for
Identity Claims and Human Rights: From Politics to Courts, 9 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS (forthcoming
2016) (discussing the European Court of Human Rights).
114. See Zumbansen, supra note 25.
115. Bermann, supra note 46, at 338.
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example, the European human rights regime—while they have found less
expression in other areas, such as trade and investment. In contrast, more fluid
and informal institutional settings typically trigger fewer demands for
subsidiarity, and they are also not as well suited to the application of the
principle as more formal decisional processes.
The extent and direction of subsidiarity in practice contrast significantly
with the normative case for subsidiarity we develop. We argue that strong
subsidiarity, based on considerations of self-government and value pluralism,
should be seen as a general default rule across issue areas, and that it should
apply especially firmly in areas in which weighty, justice-based reasons for
upscaling decisionmaking are not easily identifiable. These reasons include, first
and foremost, economic domains such as trade and investment, where one
would expect political and judicial bodies to practice significant deference to
domestic decisionmaking. In other areas, such as international security or
environmental regulation, which deal with issues of direct transboundary
impact, we advocate for a weak version of subsidiarity—one that retains a
general presumption for the local, but lowers the threshold for upscaling
decisionmaking. As for human rights, our assessment is more ambivalent
because the scope and extent of rights ought to be defined with input from
national and international levels, so as to counter potential biases against
vulnerable groups in the national political process.
Subsidiarity is not a cure-all for the ills of global governance, but it is
beginning to shape different areas and institutional contexts, and it holds
significant promise as normative and legal guidance for institutional design and
for the exercise of authority in the global realm. The landscape of subsidiarity is
bound to remain variegated, but the concept is gaining ground and for many
actors holds much appeal as a principled way of balancing the need for strong
global cooperation with a continuing emphasis on the value of local selfgovernment.

